Chapter XXXI: Pomerlane Strikes Back

Mid-February to March 6th, 1112, VTE

Campaign Map

Departing from their starting locations on February 14th, the Imperial armies advanced rapidly into Uppland and Ingria according to plan. Pomulius saw the movements but was unsure about where they were attacking towards, so he orders Mansfeld to keep his army on high alert. Unfortunately for Pomulius, the messenger was intercepted by SFK agents dressed as Pomeranians at Zerbst who had been stationed there just for this under the orders of Pomerlane and the leader of SFK, Oskar-Pomu Zierke, when the latter proposed this as a way of disrupting communication. This setback went completely unnoticed by Pomulius, who received a forged letter from the SFK a day later that showed that the message had gotten through to Mansfeld.

Either way, Pomulius was on high alert and by the 21st, had diagnosed that the Imperial Troops were likely trying to cut off Mansfeld from his army. He would start marching towards Mansfeld on the 22nd but immediately ran into constant issues with Imperial Cavalry and Irregulars harassing him which slowed his march down to a crawl along with the muddy roads. This would only grow worse with the arrival of Heinrich-Pomu von Quedlinburg's division the next day and their successful delaying actions they would conduct through the rest of the week. Pomulius suspected something was up but not wanting to fall into a trap himself and believing that Mansfeld was already on the march, he continued his slow slog towards Hainfeld.

Meanwhile, Mansfeld had been suffering from disinformation too thanks to the SFK also capturing his messengers and sending back false orders from Pomulius to stand his ground for now. It cannot be underestimated how great this was to the success of the operation, because it played right into Pomerlane's assessment of Mansfeld as lacking initiative and being cautious. Mansfeld had also been led to believe by his scouts that the Imperial forces were just trying to cause havoc on his command, as Imperial Light Cavalry had masterfully gained the upper hand already and had successfully screened the infantry columns approaching the road. Mansfeld still was worried, and he sensed that something was bigger was at play but wanted to wait to see how things developed before committing himself. It was before campaigning season after all, and cavalry engagements had happened often during the winter thus far.

This all would change after the Battle of Hainfeld on the 26th of February. The Imperial forces outnumber the garrison of the important crossroad town by 4 to 1 and caught them completely off guard by the speed of their advance. In a short battle, the First and Second Divisions of the Black Army crushed the garrison and sent them flying into the forests and across the Olm River. News of this reached both Pomulius and Mansfeld that afternoon and sent them into a panic. Pomulius immediately would pick up his pace, leaving his baggage train behind at Annaburg; and Mansfeld finally sprang into action.

Mansfeld started his march towards Hainfeld, which was the designated rendezvous point set by Pomulius. He marched his men hard on the 27th but the same day was met at the hamlet of Roßlau by Hackenberg's division, which had made breakneck pace to ensure they arrived their first. Hackenberg's outnumbered force fought hard Mansfeld's army hard to a bloody draw, by which 4,000 of the 12,000 men of the division had become casualties thanks to his decision to launch several failed attacks that he hoped would convince Mansfeld that the force he faced was much larger than it was. The "ruse" worked but not because of Mansfeld believing Hackenberg's division was larger than it was but because of reports of two more divisions marching towards him along the main road. He fell back the next day to Bergwitz and arrived there at night fall. It became apparent that the baggage trains that the Pomeranians were using were slowing them down massively and that it would have been likely that the upcoming disaster would have been avoided had they marched without them. The muddy roads of February were taking their toll on the Pomeranians.

Grenadiers of the Black Army's 3rd Division fight valiantly at Roßlau, driving back Mansfeld's first attack with great cost

Frost fall and snow over the night of February 28th and March 1st had finally made the roads solid again. Pomulius's army had been divided into two separate columns for ease of travel and forced back Heinrich-Pomu's division back to the river Olm by March 1st. Word had reached Mansfeld's army that Beelitz and Saalow had been captured by Imperial forces, which caused Mansfeld to hesitate. Should he stand at Bergwitz and wait for Pomulius to break through to him? That seemed like a good option considering he was now surrounded on 3 sides. Falling back was out of the question as well, because it would just further his distance between him and Pomulius. He would finally decide at noon to march north towards Woltersdorf and try to break through towards Beelitz. In a campaign where every hour counted, Pomerlane's assessment of Mansfeld rang ever truer. He was too methodical to react properly to the situation.

But Mansfeld should not be blamed too much at this point either. Disinformation, mud, lack of proper intelligence, and above all, the mistake made by Pomulius to put Mansfeld's army at Bergwitz and not Hainfeld had put him in this position. His caution, while in hindsight a terrible decision, was justified because Mansfeld understood that Pomerlane preyed up aggressive opponents like a lion. He had studied Pomerlane's campaign in Syrenia and watched how aggressiveness had led to repeated disasters for the Ryuguards. With orders to stand given to him and having seen Imperial Cavalry harass his own army all winter, he had no reason to assume that Pomerlane was launching a masterclass campaign against him in the February mud until it became clear after Hainfeld. But Mansfeld's biggest mistake was his lack of aggression at Roßlau, where if he had committed to it, driven back Hackenberg and pushed either along the main road or taken the southern road to Kirchenholz. That mistake, along with the other factors would lead to his ultimate doom in the coming days.

Nonetheless, the forces of the Imperial armies had by March 2nd had effectively trapped Mansfeld. It was now time to destroy him.

Mansfeld reached the town of Woltersdorf in the afternoon of March 3rd to find himself surrounded on all sides. Mansfeld realized now that he was surely doomed, but he would not go down without a fight. After resting his men and skirmishing on the 3rd, he decided to try to break out of the trap on the 4th with an all-out attack towards the northeast. At Dawn, the Pomeranians attacked the 3rd division of the Archducal Army with everything they had. Fighting was fierce and there was a point early on when it looked like Mansfeld would break through, but when the Black Army's 1st and 2nd Divisions launched a counterattack on the flanks of Mansfeld's army, they were forced to withdraw to Woltersdorf by noon. With Imperial cannons begin to barrage the village, Mansfeld decided to surrender at 1400 hours. The remainder of the Army of Mansfeld, some 20,000 men, layed down their arms and surrendered to the Imperial armies.

Men of the 1st and 2nd Division of the Black Army push back Mansfeld

It was fortunate that they did too, because Pomulius had just broken through to Hainfeld the previous day and was marching along the main road to rescue Mansfeld. At Zerbst late that evening, word of the disaster reached him, and he made all haste back to Torgau. Reaching Torgau on the sixth, he soon realized that his predicament was rather precarious and would begin immediately his march back into friendly territory. All of his successes the previous fall had just been undone by an unexpected campaign that he did not believe was possible in the muddy roads. His reckless deployment of both of his armies had cost him dearly, but he couldn't dwell on it. Sending a message to Salzwedel requesting 50,000 men to be raised, he departed ready to finally get his revenge on Pomerlane.

Pomerlane and his armies had just one a great victory over the Allies in a campaign that could be largely attributed to excellent staff work, brilliant maneuvering by subordinates, surprise and intelligence work. Its success convinced him that he should reorganize his army further to take advantage of the speed and flexibility shown by the individual divisions operating independently. Perhaps he could use this on a larger scale? Either way, those reforms would be in the future and Pomerlane had to capitalize on his success thus far. The Count of Glückstadt-Schwerin was awaiting his invasion of Pomerania and Pomulius was in full retreat. There would be no time to celebrate yet, now was the time to crush Pomulius completely and flip the course of the war completely into his favor.